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Introduction
Insurance policies are contracts
of adhesion with terms dictated entirely by the insurance company. For
example, in auto insurance, the insured has no negotiating power in
specifying terms of coverage. Ironically, the insured may find each insurer offering (dictating) essentially
the same basic poJicy provisions. This
is so because auto insurers subscribe
to a trade association, Insurance Services Organization, Inc., which provides to the competing auto insurers
drafts of the policy language recommended for use in their policies.
Nevertheless, the auto policy is a
contract, and the coufts sometimes
speak of it as the contract "between
the parties" or "to which the parties
agreed" as though the insureds had
any role or choice in negotiating the
terms.

Therefore, when disputes develop about the validity of a clause,
the insurer benefits by arguing the
sanctity of contract especially if the
terms at issue are not ambiguous.
However, counsel for the insured or
the claimant tort victim cannot iust
genuflect at the aJtar of the rvritten
insutance contract just because the
clause at issue is in black ink on
white paper and unambþous at that.
As Professor Corbin said:

[]t

may be pointed out that

"liberty of contract" as that
term is used by its admiret
includes two very different
elements. These are the privilege of doing the acts constituting the ffansaction and the
power to make it tegally operative. One does not have "liberty of coÍtttact" unless
orgarized society both for-
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bears and enforces, forbears to
penalize him for making his
bargain and enforces it for him
after it is made.

This is the "liberty of contract"
that has so often been extolled as one

of

the great boons

of modern

demo-

cnac civi\zatioh, as one of the principal causes of prosperity and
comfort. ,{nd yet the very fact that a
chapter on "legality'' of contract
must be written shows that we have
never had and never shall have un-

limited liberty of contract, either in
its phase of societal forbearance or in
its phase of societal enforcement.
There are mâny contraci transactions
¡hat arc definitely forbidden by the
law, forbidden under pains and penalties assessed for crime and tort; and
there arc many moïe such transactions that are denied judicial enforcement even though their makers are
not subject to affrmative pains and
penalties. ,{rthur

on Contracts $

L. Corbin, Corbin

1376.2

Consequently, an unambþous
clause with detrimental effect to the "
insured client or claimant must be
reviewed to determine whether it is
valid. The fact is, a black-and-white
contract clause may be invalid. Fitst,
it may directly violate a statute.
Montana's Insurance Code, Title 33,
Montana Code,A.nnotated, is a compendium of rougtrly 600 pages of
statutory regulation of insurance and
insurance companies. An auto insurance ptovision may violate a code
section of that title (or any other
pertinent title) rendering it invalid.
For instance,
alto insurance policy
^n
provision providing for immediate
cancellation of the poJicy for nonpayment of premium would violate
MCÂ S 33-23-212Q), which tequires

the carder to cancel only after 10
days' notice of cancellation.
Second, though an insurance
clause may not directly violate a statute, it may be found to be invalid for
violating public policy as expressed in
the state constitution or statutes. As

the court said in Youngblood u
Atnedcan States Ins. Co.r3 "The
only exception to enforcirìg an unambiguous contract term is if that term
violates public policy or is against

good morals."'
Third, a provision that doesnt
violate a code provision may be
found to be violative of "public
policy'' and thereby rendered invalid.

In Fïrst Bank (N.A.)-Billings u.
Ttansamedca Insutance Company,a the Montana Supreme Court
defined "public poJicy'? as "that principle of law which holds that no
ciazen can lawfi-rlly do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against public good."
Hence, an insurance provision "injurious to the public or public good"
could be void as against public policy.
The court, in Fr¡s¿ Bank, set out the
sources of public policy for purposes

of determiningif

an insurance prac-

tice or policy was in derogatitrn
pubJic policy:

of

In determining the public

of this state,

policy

legislative

enactments must yield to constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions must recognize
and yield to constitutional pro-

visions and legislative enactments.

Finaþ
I(enneth

as insurance scholar

S. Abraham says, there

is "a

more diffuse but no less important
source of public policy; judicial sen.

Prcn
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r"l

sitivity to the difference between
good and evil, fairness and unfairness, straight dealing and over reaching. Even when all other tests for the
validity of insurance policy provisions have been exhausted, this residual category of restrictions on
what may and may not be included in
a policy remains."5 The Montana

Supreme Court

in Fitst Bank

sttessed,'Judicial decisions are

a

superior repository of statements
about pubJic policy only in the absence of constitutional and valid
legislative declarations." Nevertheless,
if the Montana Constitution and
legislative enactments reflect no par-

ticulat public poJicy in regard to an
insurance provision, the courts may
still test the provision against their
o.um statements of public policy. The
Montana Supreme Court has been
rìiligent in scrutinizing auto insurance
poJicy exclusions, offsets, conditions
and other clauses in the bright light
of its own statements of ('public

policy'' to determine whether the
provisions or clauses are valid.
Consequently, the lawyer faced
with an unambþous auto insurance
policy provision detrimental ro his
insured or clatntant must anaþe the

provision to determine

if it is invalid

for violating:
1. a code provision in Title 33 or

Title 61 of the Montana Code
Annotated;
2. public policy as expressed in the

Montana Constitution;
3. public policy as expressed elsewhere in the Montana Code

Annotated;
4. public poJicy as expressed by the
Montana Supreme Court; and
5. public policy on some previously
unrecognized argument that the
provision is injurious to society.
A.uto policies covering motor
vehicles operated in Montana com-

monly contain provisions deemed
jnvalid. While the Rates and Forms
Bureau of the Montana Insurance
Commissioner's Office reviews auto
poJicy forms and approves or disap-

proves their provisions for use in
Montana, the policies arc draftedby
the ISO and generally intended by the
insurer for use in many states in
which it operates. The Montana Rates
and Forms Bureau may not identifii a

o

m0ny
Board-certified experts in
all health-care disciplines.
Available to review and testify
in medical negl¡gence cases.
30 years, 6,000 cases
Member, American Gollege

of Legal Medicine
references statewide

particular ISO clause as having been
declared invalid by the Montana Supreme Court, or the carrier may simply continue using a form with the

invalid clause in it.
More importantly, given the reach

of interstate commerce and recreation today, tens of thousands of
motor vehicles are operated in MonTana each year under out-of-state
insurance policies. In a line of cases,
the Montana Supreme Court has held
that out-of-state
poücies apply^rto
ing to accidents that happen in Montana will be construed under

Montana law, fn Kemp u. Allstate,6
1979, the court determined that
the law of the place of performance

in

and not place

of

execution governed

the insurance policy contract. Âfter
considering the basic insuring agreement, the territoridtty provision and
t-he "payment of loss" provision, the
court ruled that the place where the
judgment would be obtained v/as rhe

of performance .In Youngblood
Amedcan States Ins. Co.r1 the

place
u.

Oregon policy involved contained a
choice of law provision that specified the "place of performance" and
required application of Oregon law
However, the court voided the
policy's provision for subrogation for
Medical Payments, holding that it
was unenforceable as violative of
public policy by reason of the court's

holdingin Allstate Ins. Co. u
Reitle4s which doesn't allow subrogation for Medical Pay coverage in
Montana. In Swanson u llattford
Ins. Co. of the Midwestre the court
declared that application of a Colorado choice of law provision violated
Montana's public policy that an lnsuret could only subrogate when the
insured had been "made whole." In
2003, the court in Mitchell u State

Farm Ins.

Co.rlo followed

l

rl

Kemp

holding that, even under the Restatement of Law (Second), the contract

of the place
of performance which is the "place

is governed by the law

l

where the an insuted is entitled to
j l,

P¡rcn 24
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receive benefìts, has incurred accident
related expenses, or is entitled to

judgment."
Âs these

cases illustrate, the auto

insurance policy involved will often
be an out-of-state poJicy that will

Insurance Policy Clauses and Provisions Held Invalid in Montana

Liability Coverage."Íhe "Ilousehold Exclusion"
In Transameúca Ins. Co. u

likely contain provisions violative of
Montana public policy but govefned

Royúe,11

by Montana larv. Counsel has the task

coverage was declared void as against
pubJic policy. The policy excluded

of identifying the offending

clauses

and persuading the insurer, or the

court

if

necessary, that the clause is

1) governed by Montana law and 2)
invalid and unenforceable insofar as
it violates Montana law or pubJic
policy.
SØhat follows here is a review of
particular insurance clauses that have
been ruled as invalid and unenforceable because they violate Montana
statutes or public policy as reflected
in the Montana Constitution, statutes,

or court decisions. \ü/here possible,
the authors will quote verbatim the
insurance clause from the policy
involved or will quote the standard
langoage from the ISO forms that
would be the likely equivalent to the
clause involved in the case. This
ardcle focuses on auto insurance
policies as opposed to other casualty
potcies, and the authors have
grouped the cases under the coverage
headings. Cases under Bodily Injury

Liability coverage generaþ will reflect issues of validity under the
Mandatory Liability Protection Act,
MCA S 61-6-301and the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act,
MCA S 61.-6-103 et seq. Cases undet
Uninsured Mototist coveÍage generally involve issues of vaJidity as a
mattel of public policy parttculaily
in relation to the UM statute, MCA S
33-23-201,. The Underinsured Mototist coverage clauses reflect decisions based on judicially developed
public policy grounds particularþ the
reasonable expectations doctrine.
Finally, cases grouped under the
Medical Pay coverage clauses will

illusttate the recent battleground of
coverage issues.
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a 1983 case, the "household
exclusion clause" in Bodily Injury

liability coverage fot "bodily injury to
any person who is related by blood,
marriage, or adoption to [the in-

if

that person resides in [the
insured's] household at the time of
the loss." In Royle, a catastrophicaþ
injured chld sued her mother alleging
her mother negligently caused the
daughter's injuries while the daughter
was a passenger in her mother's auto.
Transamerica denied coverage by
reasorl of the exclusion. The Montana Supreme Court held the exclusion violated public policy implicit in
Montana's Mandatory Liability Protection Act, MCA S 61-6-301 and the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
sured],

Act, MCA S 61-6-103 et seq. The
court reâsoned that $61-6-301 requires minimum JiabiJity coverage to
cover "loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for injury suffered by
any person," and the act made no

exception for injury by family members. The case was also based on a

recurring Montana judicial public
policy theme of failure to "honor the
reasonable expectations" of the insuted. Quoting Professor I(eeton, the
court stated the princþle as follows:

"The objectively teasonable expectations of applicants and intended
benefìciades regarding the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored
even though painstaking study of the

policy ptovisions would have negated
those expectations," The coutt said
the insured would reasonably expect
the liabiìity coverage to extend to
household members.
After Royle, insurers modifìed
the household exclusion into what is
known as the "step down" household

exclusion which, for family members,
blocks coverage fot amounts over the

minimum $25,000limit of liability. In
Shook u. State Fatm Mutual Ins.
Co.,12 State Farm's household exclusion tead as follows:

When Coverage A Does Not
Apply: There is no coverage...
2. For Any Bodiþ Injør1 to: ... c.
an1 insøred ot aîy member of
an in¡ured's famtly residing in
the insured's household to the
extent the limits of liability of
this policy exceed the limits of
liability required by law."
Judge Hatfìeld held that exclusion void by reason of ambiguity. He
reasoned that the exclusion defeats
the purpose of the Mandatory Liabil-

ity Protection statutes and is ambþous as it could be interpreted "as
intended to make clear the Jiability
provisions of the policy do not provide personal accident insurance to
any insured."
In companion cases in 1994, the
Montana Supreme Court invalidated
two "step down" household exclusions and tefused to enforce them. In

Leibrund u. l{ational Fatmerc
[Jnion Prcp. and Cas. Co. and
Cole u Truck Insutance Exchangerl3 injured family plaintiffs
were precluded by step-down household exclusions from recovering

anything more than the minimum
of BI coverage required under
the Mandatory Liability Protection
Act. In LeÌbtand, the policy excluded "bodily injury to you or any
relative to the extent the limits of
liability of this poJicy exceed the
limits of liability required by law."

limits

The renewal declarations page stated
that "fl]iability payments to household members are limited to the FinanciøJ. Responsibility timits of the
policy state." Similady, in Cole, an
exclusion in an endorsement to the
poücy precluded coverage "Arising

out of the liability

of

any insured

for

Pece 25

bodily injury to you or a family member to the extent the limits of liability
of this poLicy exceed the limits of
liabiJity required by law" The declarations page in Cole gave no notice of
the limitation of recovery by family
members.

The court found the policy provisions in question in each case to be
"unclear and ambiguous" because
they didn't provide the consumer
untrained in the law any w^y to know
the limit of liabiJity when a family
member was the injured claimant.
The court declared the provisions

invalid and unenforceable. Most importantly, the court prospectiveþ
warned of risk rhat any clarifìed
provision would still be deemed unconscionable because the poJicies
of adhesion that
"atbi:rrartly preclude full coverage for
farntly members, as opposed to all
other persons" iri a market in u¡hich
family members cannot obtain full

would be conffacts

coverage, One can reasonably conclude that the step-down household
exclusion is invalid in Montana as
will be any such provision which is
clarifìed, since any such clarification
will likely violate publc poJicy for the
same reasons.

Note, however, that the court
enforced a household vehicle exclusion in Amedcan Family Mutual

Ins. Co. u Livengood.la The exclusion to the Bodily Injury coverage
provided:

This covetage does not apply
¡e' *** 9. Bodily Injury or property damage arising out of the
use of a vehicle, other than
your insured car, which is
owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or
any resident of your household.
Henninger and her roommate
were each insuted by American Family. Henninger negligently injured
another while driving her roommate's
van. American defended and indem-
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ni{ìed under the roommate's policy
but refused to indemniSr under
Henninger's liability policy because
of the above exclusion. Henninger
contended the provision, as in Royle,
violated the Mandatory Liabiliry Protection Act, but the court disagreed
sa)'lng that the exclusion met the

if it is ddven by someone

of providing coverage for
"all persons." It simply didnt provide

Liability Coverage: "Named

mandate

without

permission is valid and enforceable.
However, the same clause is void and
unenforceable if included in the
"other cars" provision, which covers
the insured when he or she is driving
someone else's veh-icle.

Dtivef' Exclusion
In

additional Jiability coverage for other

1987, in Iowa

Mutual Ins.

vehicles.

Co.

Similarþ in Stutzman u Safeco
Ins. Co.rls the court upheld u ri-iiut
exclusion as applied to UIM coverage
on the ground that "there is no statutory mandate for underinsured mo-

and tefused to enforce a named
drivet exclusion. There, the insurer
had agreed to exclude from coverage
the insureds' sons, by name, in order
to make the covetage affordable. The

torist coverage in Montana." That

clause read as follows:

u. Dauis,l7 the

court invalidated

exclusion provided:

It is agreed that an insurance
But undednsured motor vehicle does not include any motor vehicle:.. 3) owned by or
furnished for the regular use
of the named insured ot afiy
relative.

Liability Coverage: "Without
Pe t mis sio nt' Excúus ion
In Allstate Ins. Co. u.
IIankinson 16 Hankinson, a juvenile,
negligently dtove someone else's auto
without their permission causing
injuries to a thfud party. His father's
insuret, Allstate, refused to defend or
indemnift because Allstate's coverage
of "non-owned" autos extended only
to 'A non-owned auto used by you or
a resident relative with the owner's
permission." The Montana Supreme
Court held that the policy definition
was "void as contrary to public
policy'' because it provides less coverage than is statutorily required by
the Mandatory LiabiJiry Protection
statute, MCA S 61-6-301..
Note that the statute requires
vehicles operated in Montana "by the
owner or with the owner's permission" to carry minimum limits of
insurance. Consequendy, a Bodily
Injury coverage exclusion that excludes liabiJity coverage on the auto

and coverage under this policy
shall be null and void with

fespect to any claims arising
out of the operatiorì, use, or
occupancy of the automobile
descdbed in this policy, or out
of the operation, usê or occupancy of any other automobile
to which the terms of this
policy otheru¡ise extends, by
the following named person(s):
Jeffery L. Davis (DOB 12-03-

& Alan Davis (DOB 8-2557) Sons of the lnsured.
59)

Provided, however, this endorsement shall not be effective if the automobile is
operated by the named insured
or the described automobile is
operated by any person other

thanJeffery of Alan and such
operation of the described
automobile is by and under the
express permission of the
named insured.

The court held that the exclusion
violated Montana's Mandatory Liability Protection Äct, reasoning that the
Mandatory Liability statutes arc desþed to ptovide continuous coverage to the general public, and the
named driver exclusion is "repugnant

Pren 27

to this state's interest in protecting
innocent victims of automobile accidents." However, the legislature im-

of: 4. Bodily injury to an employee of any insured person
arising in the course of em-

mediately amended the Mandatory
Protection Act to expressly authorize
the use of named driver exclusions
ancl accompanied the statute with a
statement of legislative intent that, as

ployment.

m^ttet of public policy such exclusions were desirable to allow premiums to be affordable.l8
^

Liability Coverage.' The "employee" exclusion as applied to
thitd parties
The Montana Federal Court held
the "employee" exclusion to the auto
liability coverage to be ovetþ broad
and void if applied to thitd parties
instead of employers in Fr?e,Ins.

Exchange w Tibi, Kayset and
Allstate Ins. Co.le The exclusion
stated:

Allstate will not pay for damages an insured person is legally obJigated to pay because

court held that insofat

The court reasoned that the
poJicy may properþ exclude colrerage
where an employee seeks to recoYer
from the employet (workers' compensation exclusiviry) but not whete the
employee seeks to recover ftom an
insured third party.

as the policy

excluded permissive use customers
who have their own coverage, it is
void because it does not provide the
statutory mandatory minimum coverage for "all vehicles owned or oper-

ated" in Montana. The coutt
reasoned that the poJicy sets a ceiling
of coverage, not the floot, as re-

quired by the mandatory minimum
coverage statutes tequire, The exclusion was ruled void because it is
contrary to public policy.

Liability Coverage.' Permissive
Uset Exclusion
ln Swank w Chtyslet Ins.
Corp.r2o the insurer issued à gange
policy to an auto dealer that excluded
Jiability coverage for customers who
were permissive users of the dealer's
loaner cars. The policy extended
coverage to the customers driving
loanet cars to the extent the customer
did not have personal auto coverage
avaslalle that met the mandatory

minimum limit. (Ihe poJicy language
is not contained in the decision.) The

-,^s*uÏ"ff
gA-

Medical Pay Coverage: Subtogation Clause
In Allstate Ins. Co. v Reitle42l
the court held medical paymeflt subrogation clauses ate invalid. The
standard subtogation clause reads

as

follows:22

OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER
PÂ\.IVIENT

A.

If we make a payment un-

der this policy and the person
to or for whom payment u/as

Ï::ï:ff:"r*

Experienced Legal Video Specialist & Documentary Produce,

"â,S

1-8BB-gg5-8439
(406) 523-6650
joels@montana.com
www. monta naheritage. com

Pecn 28

Five Valleys Video Productions
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made has a right to recover
damages from another we shall
be subrogated to that right.
That person shall do
1. \Vhatever is necessary to
enable us to exetcise our
rights; and
2. Nothing after loss to preju-

dicethem.***

If we make a payment

under this policy and the person

B.

to or for whom payment is
made tecovers damages from
another, that person shall:
1. Hold in trust for us the proceeds of the recovery; and
2. Reimburse us to the extent
of our payment.

The court noted that the insured
paid a premium for medical pay coverage and is mote likely to suffer if
med pay benefìts must be repaid
from third-party recovety. The insured often has to comprornise the
claim to settle and suffers attorney
fees and costs v/hile the insurer
claims a rryht to be reimbursed
1,00o/o of the benefits paid. The
court noted the pubJic policy against
allowing assignment of personal
injury actions and held the subrogation clause void as applied to Medical P ay coyerage. Yo u n gblo o d u.

Am. States Ins. Co.,23 followed
Reitlet in holding that subrogation
for med pay are void as
against public policy.
Note that, tn 1.997 , the legislature
added the word "subrogation" into
clauses

533-23-203Q), so

it

read:

Á. motor vehicle liabiìity policy

the statutory amendment. However,
Swanson u llattford Ins. Co.,2a in
2001, made it clear that the "made
whole" rule srill applied to subrogation so that a med pay insurer could
not subrogate untiL the insured was
made whole including attorney fees.
In essence, Swanson voided the
subtogation clause to the extent that
it allowed the insurer to subrogate
before the insuted has been made
whole including costs and attorney
fees. Then, the coutt n llardy
(2003), declated the statute unconstitutional, so Rei¿Ie¡ again appears to
be good law Flence, subrogation as
applied to medical pay coverage is
invalid in Montana and, when applied
to other coverages, valid but subject
to the "made whole" rule.

Medical Pay Coverage: Choice of
Law Prouision
In Swanson (2001), a Colorado
policy contained a choice of law
provision mandating that any dispute
over subrogation be governed by
Colorado lav¿ Colorado law allowed
subrogation in derogation of the
"made-whole" rule whle Montana
deemed such subrogation to be
against public policy. Consequently,
the court held that application of the
Colorado choice-of-law provision
violated Montana public polìcy and
refused to enforce it. As a result,
argaaliy anytime an insurance
poticy's choice-of-law provision mandates application of another state's
law which would contravene public
interest in Montana, the choice-oflaw provision itself may be unenforceable.

may also provide for other
reasonable limitations, exclusions, reductions of coverage,
or subrogation clauses that arc
desþed to prevent duplicate
payments for the same element

of

loss...

Consequently, insurers then took
the position ReÌtfter was overruled by

Tru¡¡, TnnNos - Aururvrx 2004

Medical Pay Coverage: Antìstacking Clause
Ruckdaschel u State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.r25 held the antistacking clause in Medical Pay coverage violates Montana's public policy.
The endorsement provided:
2. Policies Issued by Us to

You, Your Spouse or Relatives.., If two ore [sic] more
policies issued by us to 1ou,

loar

spouse

otJour relatiuu pro-

vide vehicle medical payments
coverage and apply to the
same bodiþ inju¿y sustained; a.

whlle

orcapling a non-owned car, a

temþorarj sub¡titute car;
þedestrian

oÍ b. as a

the total limits of

liability under all such policies
shall not exceed that of the
policy with the highest limit

of

liability."
Ruckdaschel followed Bennett

u State Fatm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co.,26 and reasoned that the same

public policy considetations that
invalidate anti-stacking clauses in
mandatory coverages "appIy to optional types of insutance coverage
such as, in this case, medical payment
coverage." Those public policy considerations were that "an insurer may
not place in an insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage for
which the insurer has received valuable consideration," and that the
insured should be entitled to a reasonable expectation of coverage up
to the aggregate limits of the policies
purchased.

The

1.997 amendment

of

MC,A.

S 33-23-203 to preclude all stacking

defeated Bennett, Ruckdaschel,
"Iloleman (I)"27 and "Iloheman
(II)u" insofar as they allowed stacking. Howevet, when llardy (2003)
declared the statute unconstitutional,
the holdings of those cases invalidating the clauses on public policy
grounds agasnbecame good lavr
Hence, under Ruckdaschel, an anrsstacking clause in Medical Pay coverage should be void as against public
policy in Montana.
However, one should note that
State Farm's "owned auto" exclusion
which effectively blocks stacking of
its Medical Pay covenge has been
held valid and enfotceable. It provides as follows:

Prcn

29
r*!

There is no coverage.
4. Fot medical .*p.nrå, fot
Bodiþ Injøry:
a. Sustained whìIe oøuþing or
through being struck by a vehicle owned or leased by ya or
any relatiue which is not insured
under this coverage[.]

by both uninsuted motorists and
underinsured motorists:

able because

We will pay compensatory

bodily iniury (meaning
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or deatþ damages that
ate due you by law from the
owner or driver

The court said that clause is not

ambþous and acts as a coverage
exclusion so that there is simply no
coverage, and no stacking question is

involved.

The court in Fatmets Alliance
Mut. Ins. Co. w Elohemanr2e also

of

IAUTO MEDTCAT- PAYMENTS COVERAGEI shown
in the Declarations.
The court followed Ruckdaschel,
above, and relied upon the pubìic
policy statements in Bennett. The
court held that, "where mulriple vehicles are insured under one policy
and where a premium is charged for
coverage of each motor vehicle listed
within the poìicy" the insurer cannot
rely on the policy's exclusionaty language to deny covetage.

ir

bodily injury liability coverage
or bonds in effect. Their total

poJicy's Declarations.

LIMIT OF'INSURANCE for

;

uninsured motor vehicle is:
2. one which is underinsured.
This is one for which there are

void. Theit provision read:

the number
of covered 'autos,' 'insufeds,'
premiums paid, claims made
or vehicles involved in the
'accident,' the most we will pay
for dl. damages resulting from
any one 'accident' is the

I

an uninsured motor vehicle . .,. ,\n

held Farmers Alüance Mutual's Med
Pay anti-stacking provision to be

1. Regardless

J

of

amount, however, is less than
the limits of this coverage.
These limits are shown in your

D. LIMTT OF INSURANCE

Uninsured Motorist Covetage.'
Liability' Offset Claus e
Gdet u. Nationwide Mut. Ins,
Co.r3o held that a clause providing
liability coverage can be offset against
recovery of uninsured motorist benefìts is invalid. In Griet, Nationwide's
policy included UM coverage which
by defìnition protected against injury

coverage shall be teduced by
* * 2, Paid or pay-

all sums:*

Then, undet "Lirnits of Payment," the policy stated, "the limits
of this coverage wül be reduced by
àny arnount paid by or for any Jiable
parties."
The court held that Grier was
actually recovering uninsured motorist benefits under the policy's UM
coverage which was protected by the
UM statute, MCÁ. S 33-23-201. As
such, the offset of liability against the
UM coverage benefìt violated the
legislative intent of the statute of
protecting the public against injury by
uninsured (in this case undeiinsured)
motorists by offering a minimum
limit of UM coverage. The offset was,
therefore, void as against public poJicy.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
Wotk Comp Reducing Clause
The court jn Sullivan u. Doe,3l
held that a clause allowing workers'
compensation benefìts paid to be
deducted from UM benefits owed
under the auto poJicy was void. The
decision dóes not reflect the actual

of

the policy, so the authors
19BB ISO language for
a sample work comp reducing clausel3z

language

will quote the

B, ,A.ny amounts otherwise
payable fot damages under this

of the "'lbodily

injury''under any of the following or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law;

or b. disability benefits law, * * x

The coutt determined that the
Montana UM statute mandated that
the insurer offer a minimum limit of
UM coverage to the insured and that
it did not provide for reducing that
limit by offsetting workers' compensation benefits. Hence, the offset was

void as against pubJic policy.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
"Ì,{o Consent to Settlement"
Clause
State Fatm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
u 'Íay1or,33 held the "no consent to

settlement' clause in UM coverage
void. That clause provided:
THE,RE IS NO COVER.\GE:
1, FOR ANY INSURED

ìøHq nnTHouT ouR
NØRITTE,N CONSENT,

SETTLES \)ruTH ANY PER_

SON OR ORGANIZATION
IøHO MAY BE LIABLE
FOR THE BODILY INJURY
The court said, "This court does

not support provisions placed on
uninsured motorist coverage that
restrict or thwart available liability
coveÍage an insured would be entitled
to in an accident.* * * The insurance
company is obligated to furnish uninsuted motor vehicle coverage, whether
it can obtain subrogation or not."
Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
Owned Auto Exclusion
tacob s on u. Imple me nt D e aúe rs
Mut. Ins, Co.r3a involved UM coverage with the following exclusion:
This policy does not apply
under Part IV (a) to bodily
injuty to an insured while

:

t'
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occupying an automobile
(other than an insured automobile) owned by the named
insuted or a telative, or
through being sttuck by such
an automobile.

public policy, reasoning that there is
no statutory requirement of contact
in the uninsured motorist statute,36
and the purpose of "mandating" UM
coverage is to protect poJicyholders
from negligence of uninsured motorists, not necessarjly contact.

The deceased was killed by an
uninsured motor vehicle while he was
driving a semi-ffactor and trailer
owned by the deceased and uninsured. Flowevet the deceased carried
UM coverage with Implement Dealers Mutual on a pickup truck he

owned. The "owned auto" exclusion
blocked him from getting UM benefits because he was not "occupying2'
the insured auto. The court held the
exclusion void because it violates the

intent

of

the UM statute, MCA S 33-

23-201,. The pubJic policy behind the

"It

unidentified motorist."

UIM is void

Uninsured Motorist Coverage.'
Government Vehicle Exclusion
Battell u Am. IIome.A,ssurance Co.r37 held the "government
vehicle exclusion" to uninsured motorist coverage void. That exclusion
provides:38

"Uninsured motor vehicle"
does not include any vehicle or

clude any class

Co.,35

contact:

'uninsuted motor vehicle' includes a ftailü of any type and
means:

þ) a hit-and-run

auto-

mobile;. . .'hit-and-run automobile' means an automobile

which causes bodily injury

to'

an insured arising out of
physical contact of such auto-

mobile with the insured or
with an automobile which the
insured is occupying at the
time of the accident. . .

equipment... owned by any
governmental unit or agency.

of vehicles, and an

insurance policy excluding all government vehicles resfticts the statutory
broad coverage and "is repugnant to
the clear public policy of Montana in
favor of uninsured motorist coverage
and against any limitarions upon
complete protection."

If

the insured sustains bodily
injury as a pedestrian and
othet underinsured motor vehicle coverage applies: a. the
total limits of Jiability undet all
such coverages shall not exceed that

of

the coverage with

the highest limit of liability;
and b. we ate liable only for

tact requirement was void as against

our share. Our share is that

2004

as against public policy.

The court rejected as irrelevant arguments that such public policy applied
only to UM coverage which is protected by statute. MC,A. S 33-23-201.
The coutt noted that its public
policy basis for stacking UM cover-

"that an insurer may not
place in an insurance policy a provision that defeats coverage for which
the insurer has received valuable
consideration." The court stated that
age \Ã/as

"the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage it to provide a source
of indemnification for accident victims when the tortfeasor does not
provide adequate indemnifìcation.'1
The court reasoned.that the public
policy that favors adequate compensation for accident victims is supported by the same public policy
considerations that invalidated antistacking provisions in UM coverage.
Finally the court based its decision
in the reasonable expectation doctrine:

Underinsured Motorist Coverage..
Anti-s t ackin g Pt ovi sion
In 1993, in Bennett u. State
Fatm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,3e fhe
court dealt with an "other insurahce"
clause that effectiveþ prohibited
stacking. The clause provided:

The coutt held the physical con-
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coverage applicable to the
accident.

The court held the "other insurance" clause prohibiting stacking of

vehicle when injured.

involved UM coverage that provided
a hit-and-run vehicle was an uninsured motor vehicle for purposes of
benefìts ptovided it made physical

the damages that

enough for a claimant to show his
injuries were caøsed b1 an utinsured or

The court reasoned that
Montanat UM statute does not ex-

IIit-and-Run
McGlWn u Safeco Ins.

of

the limit of Liability of this
coverage bears to the total of
all underinsured motor vehicle

is

statute is protection of Montanan's
against injury by uninsured motorists,
and it makes no difference if the
victim is asleep in bed, jogging, or
driving in an uninsured, but owned,

Uninsured Motorist Coverage:
Physical Contact Requitement fot

percent

Montana citizens should have
a reasonable expectation that
when they purchase separate
policies for underinsured mo-

torist coverage, they will receive adequate compensation
for losses caused by an

underinsured motorist, up to
the aggregate limits of the
policies they have purchased.

This case has been heavily cited
in later decisions for its extensive
statement of public policy bases for
voiding an insurance clause.
The court in Farmers Alliance
Mut. Ins. Co. u llolemanrao also
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held Farmers A-lliance Mutual's UIM
anti-stacking provision to be void.

Their provision tead:
D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

of the number
covered 'autos,' 'insufecls,'
premiums paid, claims made
ot vehicles involved in the
'accident,' the most we will pay
for aL damages resulting ftom
any one 'accident'is the
1. Regardless

of

LIMIT OF INSURANCE for
IUNDERTNSURED] MOTORISTS COVERAGE
shown in the Declarations.

The court quoted the public
policy language of the Bennett case,
above, and noted that where sepârâte
premiums were paid for each vehicle,
stacking should be permitted even
though there were not separate poJicies.

In Dakota Fite Ins. Co. u
Oie,al the court invalidated the antistacking provision under the Uninsured Motorist coverâge of Dakota's
auto poJicy. The court noted that the
then-appJicable anti-stacking statute,
MCA S 33-23-203, forbade stacking
regardless of the number of vehicles,

but not the number of premiums
paid. Hence, citing Bennett (1.993),
the court determined that the statLlte
did not supplant the court's public
policy that where multþle premiums
are received

for a personal and por-

table coverage, the insured is entitled
to a reasonable expectation that the
coverage can be stacked.

IIatdy w Progressive Speciahy
Ins. Co.,a2 which declared the antistacking statute, MCl\ S 33-23-203,
unconstitutional, took up the issue of
whether Progtessiveb anti-stacking
provision in its poïcy was valid. The
provision read as follows:

LIMITS OF LIABILITY
* ,l< * If an insured person is
entitled to similar benefìts under more than one (1) motor
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vehicle insurance policy issued
by us ot an afîthate company,
the maximum recovery under
all policies shall not exceed the
amount payable under the
policy v¡ith the highest dollar
benefit limits, Similar benefìts
available under more than one
(1) motor vehicle insurance
policy issued by us or an afîthmay not be added together
^te
to determine the limits of coverage avaiable under the policies for any orìe (1) accident.

The courr in llardy followed
Bennett and Chafee u U.S. Fid E
Guar. Co.rß in holding that the "provision belies the insurance
consumer's reasonable expectation

that he has purchased UIM coverage,
which by definition, is personal, portable, and, thetefore, stackable. For
this reason, we conclude the antistacking provision in this case violates Montana pubJic policy."
Hardy was followed by Mitchell
u State Fatm Ins. Co.,a which
voided the following California antistacking clause:

Limits of Liability Under
Coverage
IiabiJity

U

^re

4. The limits of
flot increased be-

cause: (a) more than one ve-

hicle is insured under this

policY...t<*t<
If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coveragez 4. lf the insurcd sustains
bodìly Ìnjuty wh:il.e occupying a vehicle not ovmed b)¡
you, your spouse or any telative and: (a) such vehicle is not
described on the declarations
page of another policy providing uninsured motot vehicle
coverage; and

þ) its driver is:
(1) you, your spouse or any

relative, or Q) any other person not insured under another
such policy. then (a) the total
limits of liability under all ap-

plicable poJicies issued by us
shall not exceed that of the
one with the highest limit of
liability. . .

The court in Mitchell cited
Bennett, IIañy, and Chaffee for
the public policy stâtements in those
cases as they applied to stacking of
UIM coverage where the insurer had
received fìve separate premiums for

personal and portable coverage. The
court concluded, "fn shott, an antistacking provision that permits an
insurer to receive valuable consideration by charging premiums for coverage that is not provided violates
Montana public policy."

Underinsured Motorist Coverage.'
Subrogation Clause
In So¡ensen u Farmerc Ins,
Exchange,as Farmers's refused UIM
benefìts to its insured because it
found out she settled with the
tortfeasor and released the insurer's
subrogation rights without its consent. In fact, the tortfeasor was judgment proof. The subrogation clause
provided:

In the event of any payment
under this policy, we are entitled to all the rights of recovery of the person to whom
payment was made against
another. That person must sign
and deliver to us any legal papers relating to that recovery,
do whatever else is necessary
to help us exercise those rights
and do nothing after loss to
prejudice our rights.

The court adopted a "no prejudice" rule holding that, unless the
insurer was actually prejudiced, it
could not deny the insured indemnity
benefits under the UIM coverage for
releasing its subrogation rights. The
court said: SØe favor this approach as
a matter of public policy. The purpose of underinsured motorist insur-
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ance is to provide a source

of indem-

nification for accident victims when
the tortfeasor does not provide adequate indemnification.

In Fatmets Ins. Exchange

u.

Chdstensona6 the court voided the
subrogation clause insofar as it might
allow an insurer to press "all of the
insured's right of recovery'' even if
that were more than the insuter paid
the insured. The clause provided:
Subrogation. In the event of
any payment under this poJicy,
the company shall be subrogated to all the insured's right
of recovery therefore, against
any person or orgatizaùon,
and the insured shall execute
and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is
necessary.

to secure such rights.

The insured shall do nothing
after loss to prejudice such
rights.

The court noted that this clause

it possible for the insurer to
collect mote from subrogation than
what it originaþ paid to the insured
and said that UM/UIM payments
makes

may only be subrogated to the

amount the insurer actuàl7y paid out.

Underinsuted Motorist Coverage.'
Exhaustion Clause
Augustìne u. SimonsonaT held
that "exhaustion" clauses in UIM
policies are void. The clause in
Augustine provided:
\X/e

wül pay under this cover-

age only after the limits

of

Iiability under any applicable
bodily injury liability bonds
or poJicies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.

Hence, the insured could not
receive any benefìt of the UIM coverage, until he had settled with or received a judgment against thè
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tortfeasor's liabiìity insurance. The
court reasoned that requiring exhaus=
tion as a precondition of obtaining
UIM coverage is contra(y to public
policy and unenforceable. Exhaustion
clauses promote litigatìon expenses,

UIM payments, and fail to consider the insured may have a valid
reason for accepting less than the
tortfeasor's policy limits. In August.ine, Justice Regnier set forth a procedure for demanding and determining
UIM benefìts after demand was.made
on the tortfeasor's insurer for settlement of the bodily injury claim but
before settlement of the claim against
the tortfeasor.
delay

Underinsured Motorist Coverage:
(1) Nattow Definìtion of UIM and
(2) LÍabìlìty Offset
The court n llardy u Progressive Specialty Ins. Co,,a8 declated
two important clauses invalid. First,
the poJicy used what the authors call
the "narrow" definition of UIM.
That is, it defines an underinsured
motorist by comparing that motorist's

Bodily Injury JiabiJity coverage with
the insured's limit

of UIM

coverage.

Consequently, rn any case where the
BI coverage available equals or exceeds the insured's UIM limit, the

insured wrll get no UIM benefit even
if his or her damages exceed the BI
coverage. The "broad" UIM defìnition, on the other hand, defines an
underinsured motorist by comparing
that motorist's Bodily Injury JiabiJity
limit with the insured's tort damages.
This is a much more consumer

friendly defìnition. Progressive's narrow definition provided as follows:

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 2. "Underinsured
motot vehicle" means aland
motor vehicle or trail,er of any
type to which a bodily iniury
liabiìity bond or policy applies
at the time of the accident,
but the sum of all applicable
limits of JiabiJity for bodily

iniury is less than the covetage limit for Undetinsured
Motorist Coverage shown on
the Declarations Page. A,n
underinsuted motor vehicle
does not include any vehicle or
equipment. . . ft) that is an

uninsured motor vehicle.
The UIM coverage alse contained an'roffset" provision allowing
the insurer to reduce UIM benefits
owed by any BI liability benefi.ts the
injured insured recovered from the
tortfeasor.
The Limits of Liability shown
on the Declarations Page for
Undetinsured Motorist Coverage shall be reduced

tiy all

sums:'1. paid because

of

bodily injury by or on behalf
of any persons or orgarúz.ations who may be legally responsible, including, but not
limited to, all sums paid under
Part l-Tiability to Others.

' The declarations page showed
that the insured purchased $50,000
limits of UIM coverage for a sepatate
premium. Howevet, the court's analysis was that there were almost no
situations where the insured would
ever recover $50,000 under the two
quoted clauses. For instance, in every
case where the tortfeasor caried

Montana mandatory minimum
($25,000) limits of insurance, the
$50,000Imit would be teduced by

$25,000. If the tortfeasor was uninsured, the UIM would not apply at
all. In every case where the tortfeasor's liability coverage was equal to
or greater than the insuted's UIM

limit, no UIM benefits would be due.
Consequently, the court said, "we
conclude that the offset provision, as
well as the defìnition of underinsured
motorist, violate Montana prilti.
policy because they create an ambþity tegarding coverage, render coverage that Progressive promised to
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are less than the limits of liability of this coverage. . .

provide illusoty, and defeat the
insured's reasonable expectations."
In reaching its holding, the court

in llardy took cognizance of the
previous decision of the Montana
Federal District Court in
'Ítansametica Ins. Gtoup u

The "limits of liabiJity" section
reflected the offset of liabiJity coverage recovered agarnst the

6. If the damages are caused
by an undetinsurcd motor

Osbotn,ae There, Transamerica used
the narrow defìnition of UIM:
a land

of

vehicle, the most we pay
will be the lesser of: (a) the
difference between the limits of liability of this coverage and the amount paid to
tk.c insured by or for any
person or organization who
is or may be held legaliy liable for t}l'e bodily iniury;
or (tt) the diffetence between the amount of the

motor vehicle or trailer

any q/pe to which a bodily

injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the accident but its limit for bodily
injury liability is less than the
limit of liability for this cover^ge.

As'tn llatdy, the federal court
compared the declarations page with
the UIM defìnition and concluded
that the two were inconsistent. The
court observed that there were few
circumstances in which the insured
would recoveï anything and none in
which the insured would recover the
$50,000 represented on the declarations page. The court found the defìnition to be ambþous and to violate
. the reasonable expectations of the
insured so as to be against public
poJicy.

Mitchell

Farm Ins.
Co.,so followed lIatdy in holding a
similar narrow UIM definition and
UIM liabiìity offset void. It is noteworthy that State Farm's policy, unlike Progressive's in lIatdy
contained no separate UIM coverage,
the UIM defìnition being part of the
UM coverage, and that no sepafate
premium was paid fot the UIM coverage. State Farm's policy defined
UIM as follows:
u. State

Undednsuted Motot Vehicle
- means a land motor vehicle,
the ownership, maintenance ot
use of which is: f . insured or
bonded for bodily injury Jiability at the time of the accident,
but 2. the limits of the liability
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UIM:

insuted's damages for
bodþ iniury,andt}l'e
amount paid to tl":'e insurcd
by or fot any person or organizatton who is or may be
held legally liable for the
bodily injury.
In voiding State Farm's UIM
defìnition and the liability offset, the
court said the undednsured motorist
definition contravenes the insured's
expectation that coverage would exist
where the tortfeasor's limits of liability

are less than the stacked

UIM

of

the insured. The offset
provision violates public policy because one premium is charged for
UM and UIM coverage and allowing
an offset defeats the purpose of the
coverage

"mandatory" UM coverage. The
insurer charged five ptemiums for

UIM

Conclusion
In addition to knowing which
provisions in auto insurance have
been declated void for violating the
code or for contravening public
poìicy, counsel must be able to analyze provisions to identifi' those
which may potentially be void and
unenforceable. Review of the above
cases reveals that an auto insurance
policy provision may be challenged as
void and unenforceable if the provi-

sion is:
f.

in direct violation of the Montana
Insurance Code or other Montana
statutes;

2. ambiguous so as to be void and
unenforceable;
3, against pubtic policy for violating
the reasonable expectations of the

insured;

4. agatnst public policy for creating
"illusory'' covetage;
5. against public policy because it
takes away coverage for which the
insured has paid a premium; or
6.

in some other way injurious to the
publìc ot against public good.
As these

cases illustrate, the

courts are highly involved in the
regulation of insurance. Counsel
should be ever mindful that the courts
only heat a challenge to an auto insurance provision if counsel recognizes
the provision's violation of public
poJicy and challenges

it in court.

o

coverage.

Endnotes

Arbitration Clauses
Note: John Morrison, Insurance
Commissioner for the State of Montana, prohibits arbitration clauses in
contracts of insutance. Consequently,
the Rates and Forms Bureau advises
the insurers that they may not include

them in the policy forms they submit
for use in Montana.
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